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Abstract. Our state of mind is based on experiences and what other
people tell us. This may result in conflicting information, uncertainty, and
alternative facts. We present a robot that models relativity of knowledge
and perception within social interaction following principles of the theory
of mind. We utilized vision and speech capabilities on a Pepper robot to
build an interaction model that stores the interpretations of perceptions
and conversations in combination with provenance on its sources. The
robot learns directly from what people tell it, possibly in relation to its
perception. We demonstrate how the robot’s communication is driven
by hunger to acquire more knowledge from and on people and objects,
to resolve uncertainties and conflicts, and to share awareness of the per-
ceived environment. Likewise, the robot can make reference to the world
and its knowledge about the world and the encounters with people that
yielded this knowledge.
Keywords: robot, theory of mind, social learning, communication
1 Introduction
People make mistakes; but machines err as well [14] as there is no such thing
as a perfect machine. Humans and machines should therefore recognize and
communicate their “imperfectness” when they collaborate, especially in case of
robots that share our physical space. Do these robots perceive the world in the
same way as we do and, if not, how does that influence our communication with
them? How does a robot perceive us? Can a robot trust its own perception?
Can it believe and trust what humans claim to see and believe about the world?
For example, if a child gets injured, should a robot trust their judgment of the
situation, or should it trust its own perception? How serious is the injury, how
much knowledge does the child have, and how urgent is the situation? How
different would the communication be with a professional doctor?
Human-robot communication should serve a purpose, even if it is just (social)
chatting. Yet, effective communication is not only driven by its purpose, but also
by the communication partners and the degree to which they perceive the same
things, have a common understanding and agreement, and trust. One of the
main challenges to address in human-robot communication is therefore to handle
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uncertainty and conflicting information. We address these challenges through an
interaction model for a humanoid-robot based on the notion of a ‘theory of
mind’ ([17,12]). The ‘theory of mind’ concept states that children at some stage
of their development become aware that other people’s knowledge, beliefs, and
perceptions may be untrue and/or different from theirs. Scassellati ([19] and [18])
was the first to argue that humanoid robots should also have such an awareness.
We take his work as a starting point for implementing these principles in a
Pepper robot, in order to drive social interaction and communication.
Our implementation of the theory of mind heavily relies on the Grounded
Representation and Source Perspective model (GRaSP) ([25], [8]). GRaSP is an
RDF model representing situational information about the world in combination
with the perspective of the sources of that information. The robot brain does
not only record the knowledge and information as symbolic interpretations, but
it also records from whom or through what sensory signal it was obtained. The
robot acquires knowledge and information both from the sensory input as well
as directly from what people tell it. The conversations can have any topic or
purpose but are driven by the robot’s need to resolve conflicts and ambiguities,
to fill gaps, and to obtain evidence in case of uncertainty.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses related work
on theory of mind and social communication. In Section 3, we explain how we
make use of the GRaSP model to represent a theory of mind for the robot. Next,
Section 4 describes the implementation of the interaction model built on a Pepper
robot. Finally, Section 5 outlines the next steps for improvement and explores
other possible extensions to our model. We list a few examples of conversations
and information gathered by the robot in the Appendix.
2 Related Work
Theory of mind is a cognitive skill to correctly attribute beliefs, goals, and per-
cepts to other people, and is assumed to be essential for social interaction and
for the development of children [12]. The theory of mind allows the truth proper-
ties of a statement to be based on mental states rather than observable stimuli,
and it is a required system for understanding that others hold beliefs that differ
from our own or from the observable world, for understanding different percep-
tual perspectives, and for understanding pretense and pretending. Following [4],
Scassellati decomposes this skill into stimuli processors that can detect static
objects (possibly inanimate), moving objects (possibly animate), and objects
with eyes (possibly having a mind) that can gaze or not (eye-contact), and a
shared-attention mechanism to determine that both look at the same objects
in the environment. His work further focuses on the implementation of the vi-
sual sensory-motor skills for a robot to mimic the basic functions for object,
eye-direction and gaze detection. He does not address human communication,
nor the storage of the result of the signal processing and communication in a
brain that captures a theory of mind. In our work, we rely on other technol-
ogy to deal with the sensory data processing, and add language communication
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and the storage of perceptual and communicated information to reflect conflicts,
uncertainty, errors, gaps, and beliefs.
More recent work on the ’theory of mind’ principle for robotics appears to
focus on the view point of the human participant rather than the robot’s. These
studies reflect on the phenomenon of anthropomorphism [15] [7]: the human
tendency to project human attributes to nonhuman agents such as robots. Closer
to our work comes [10] who use the notion of a theory of mind to deal with human
variation in response. The robot runs a simulation analysis to estimate the cause
of variable behaviour of humans and likewise adapts the response. However, they
do not deal with the representation and preservation of conflicting states in the
robot’s brain. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first that complement
the pioneering work of Scassellati with further components for an explicit model
of the theory of mind for robots (see also [13] for a recent overview of the state-
of-the-art for human-robot interactive communication).
There is a long-tradition of research on multimodal communication [16],
human-computer-interfacing [6], and other component technologies such as face
detection [24], facial expression, and gesture detection [11]. The same can be said
about multimodal dialogue systems [26], and more recently, around chatbot sys-
tems using neural networks [20]. In all these studies the assumption is made that
systems process signals correctly, and that these signals can be trusted (although
they can be ambiguous or underspecified). In this paper, we do not address these
topics and technologies but we take them as given and focus instead on the
fact that they can result in conflicting information, information that cannot be
trusted or that is incomplete within a framework of the theory of mind. Further-
more, there are few systems that combine natural language communication and
perception to combine the result in a coherent model. An example of such work
is [21] who describe a system for training a robot arm through a dialogue to per-
form physical actions, where the “arm” needs to map the abstract instruction to
the physical space, detect the configuration of objects in that space, determine
the goal of the instructions. Although their system deals with uncertainties of
perceived sensor data and the interpretation of the instructions, it does not deal
with modeling long-term knowledge, but only stores the situational knowledge
during training and the capacity to learn the action. As such, they do not deal
with conflicting information coming from different sources over time or obtained
during different sessions. Furthermore, their model is limited to physical actions
and the artificial world of a few objects and configurations.
3 GRaSP to model the theory of mind
The main challenges for acquiring a theory of mind is the storage of the result of
perception and communication in a single model, and the handling of uncertainty
and conflicting information. We addressed these challenges by explicitly repre-
senting all information and observations processed by the robot in an artificial
brain (a triple store) using the GRaSP model [8]. For modeling the interpreta-
tion of the world, GRaSP relies on the Simple Event Model (SEM) [23] an RDF
model for representing instances of events. RDF triples are used to relate event
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instances with sem:hasActor, sem:hasPlace and sem:hasTime object properties
to actors, places, and time also represented as resources. For example, the triples
[laugh, sem:hasActor, Bram], [laugh, sem:hasTime, 20180512] express that there
was a laugh event involving Bram on the 12th of May 2018.
GRaSP extends this model with grasp:denotedIn links to express that the
instances and relations in SEM have been mentioned in a specific signal, e.g.
a camera signal, human speech, written news. These signals are represented as
grasp:Chat and grasp:Turn which: a) are subtypes of sem:Event and therefore
linked to an actor and time, and b) derive grasp:Mention objects which point to
specific mentioning of entities and events in the signal. Thus, if Lenka told the
robot “Bram is laughing”, then this expression is considered as a speech signal
that mentions the entity Bram and the event instance laugh, while the time of
the utterance is given and correlates with the tense of the utterance.
leolaniWorld:instances
leolaniWorld:Lenka rdfs:label “Lenka”;
leolaniWorld:Bram rdfs:label “Bram”;
grasp:denotedIn leolaniTalk:chat1 turn1 char0-16.
leolaniWorld:laugh a sem:Event;
rdfs:label “laugh”;
grasp:denotedIn leolaniTalk:chat1 turn1 char0-16.
GRaSP further allows to express properties of the mentions such as the source
(using prov:wasAttributedTo1), and the perspective of the source towards the
content or claim (using grasp:hasAttribution). In the case of robot interactions,
the source of a spoken utterance is the person identified by the robot, represented
as a sem:Actor. Finally, we use grasp:Attribution to store properties related to
the perspective of the source to the claimed content of the utterance: what
emotion is expressed, how certain is the source, and/or if the source confirms
or denies it. Following this example, the utterance is attributed to Lenka; thus
we model that Lenka confirms Bram’s laughing, and that she is uncertain and
surprised. The perspective subgraph resulting from the conversation would look
as follows:
leolaniTalk:perspectives
leolaniTalk:chat1 turn1 a grasp:Turn;
sem:hasActor leolaniFriends:Lenka;
sem:hasTime leolaniTime:20180512.
leolaniTalk:chat1 turn1 char0-16 a grasp:Mention;
grasp:denotes leolaniWorld:claim1 ;
prov:wasDerivedFrom leolaniTalk:chat1 turn1 ;
prov:wasAttributedTo leolaniFriends:Lenka .
leolaniTalk:chat1 turn1 char0-16 ATTR1 a grasp:Attribution;
rdf:value
grasp:CONFIRM,
grasp:UNCERTAIN,
grasp:SURPRISE;
grasp:isAttributionFor leolaniTalk:chat1 turn1 char0-16.
Our model represents the claims containing the SEM event and its relations as:
leolaniWorld:claims
leolaniWorld:claim1 a grasp:Statement;
grasp:subject leolaniWorld:laugh;
grasp:predicate sem:hasActor;
grasp:object leolaniFriends:Bram.
1 Where possible, we follow the PROV-O model: https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-o/
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Now assume that Selene is also present and she denies that Bram is laughing by
saying: “No, Bram is not laughing”. This utterance then gets a unique identifier
e.g. leolaniTalk:chat2 turn1, while our Natural Language processing will derive
exactly the same claim as before. The only added information is therefore the
mentioning of this claim by Selene and her perspective, expressed as:
leolaniTalk:perspectives
leolaniTalk:chat2 turn1 a grasp:Turn;
sem:hasActor leolaniFriends:Selene;
sem:hasTime leolaniTime:20180512.
leolaniTalk:chat2 turn1 char0-24 a grasp:Mention;
grasp:denotes leolaniWorld:claim1 .
prov:wasDerivedFrom leolaniTalk:chat2 turn1 .
prov:wasAttributedTo leolaniFriends:Selene .
leolaniTalk:chat2 turn1 char0-24 ATTR1 a grasp:Attribution;
rdf:value grasp:DENY, grasp:CERTAIN;
grasp:isAttributionFor leolaniTalk:chat2 turn1 char0-24.
Along the same lines, if Lenka now agrees with Selene by saying “Yes, you are
right”, we model this by adding only another utterance of Lenka and her revised
perspective to the same claim, as shown below.2
leolaniTalk:perspectives
leolaniTalk:chat1 turn2 a grasp:Turn;
sem:hasActor leolaniFriends:Lenka;
sem:hasTime leolaniTime:20180512.
leolaniTalk:chat1 turn2 char0-18 a grasp:Mention;
grasp:denotes leolaniWorld:claim1 .
prov:wasDerivedFrom leolaniTalk:chat1 turn2 .
prov:wasAttributedTo leolaniFriends:Lenka .
leolaniTalk:chat1 turn2 char0-18 ATTR2 a grasp:Attribution;
rdf:value grasp:DENY, grasp:CERTAIN;
grasp:isAttributionFor leolaniTalk:chat1 turn2 char0-18.
In the above examples, we only showed information given to the robot through
conversation. GRaSP can however deal with any signal and we can therefore also
represent sensor perceptions as making reference to the world or people that the
robot knows. Assuming that the robot also sees and recognizes Bram, about
whom Lenka and Selene are talking, this can be represented as follows, where
we now include all the other mentions from the previous conversations:
leolaniWorld:instances
leolaniWorld:Bram rdfs:label “Bram”;
grasp:denotedIn leolaniTalk:chat1 turn1 char0-16,
leolaniTalk:chat2 turn1 char0-24,
leolaniTalk:chat1 turn2 char0-18;
grasp:denotedBy leolaniSensor:FaceRecognition1.
A facial expression detection system could detect Bram’s emotion and store
this as perspective by the robot, e.g. [leolaniSensor:FaceRecognition1, rdf:value,
grasp:SAD], in addition to Lenka and Selene on Bram’s state of mind.
As all data are represented as RDF triples, we can easily query all claims
made and all properties stored by the robot on instances of the world. We can
also query for all signals (utterances and sensor data) which mention these in-
stances and all perspectives that are expressed. The model further allows to
2 There are now two perspectives from Lenka on the same claim (she changed his
mind), expressed in two different utterances
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store certainty values for observations and claims as well as the result of emo-
tion detection in addition to the content of utterances (e.g. through modules for
facial expression detection or voice-emotion detection). Finally, all observations
and claims can be combined with background knowledge on objects, places, and
people available as linked open data (LOD).
Things observed by the robot in the environment and things mentioned in
conversation are thus stored as unified data in a ”brain” (triple store). This
brain contains identified people with whom the robot communicates, perceived
objects about which they communicated3, as well as properties identified or
stated of these objects or people. Given this model, we can now design a robot
communication model in combination with sensor processing on top of a theory
of mind. In the next section, we explain how we implemented this model and
what conversations can be held.
4 Communication model
Fig. 1: The four layer conversation model, comprised of I. Signal Processing layer,
II. Conversation Flow layer, III. Natural Language layer and IV. Knowledge
Representation layer.
Our communication model consists of four layers: Signal Processing layer, Con-
versation Flow layer, Natural Language layer, and Knowledge Representation
layer, which are summarized in Figure 1. Signal Processing (I) establishes the
mode of input through which the robot acquires experiences (vision and sound)
but also knowledge (communication). The Conversation Flow layer (II) acts as
the controller, as it determines the communicative goals, how to interpret human
input, and whether the robot should be proactive. Layer III is the Natural Lan-
guage layer that processes utterances and generates expressions, both of which
3 The robot continuously detects objects, but these are only stored in memory when
they are referenced by humans in the communication
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can be questions or statements. Incoming statements are stored in the brain,
while questions are mapped to SPARQL queries to the brain. SPARQL queries
are also initiated by the controller (layer II) on the basis of sensor data (e.g.
recognizing a face or not) or the state of the brain (e.g. uncertainty, conflicts,
gaps) without a human asking for it. The next subsections briefly describe the
four layers. We illustrate the functions through example dialogues that are listed
in the Appendix. Our robot has a name Leolani, which is Hawaiain for voice of
an angel, and a female gender to make the conversations more natural.
1. Signal Processing Signal processing is used to give the robot awareness of
its (social) surroundings and to recognize the recipient of a conversation. For
assessing the context of a conversation, the robot has been equipped with eye
contact detection, face detection, speech detection, and object recognition.
These modules run continuously as the robot attempts to learn and recognize
its surroundings. Speech detection is performed using WebRTC[3] and object
recognition has been built on top of the Inception[22] neural network through
TensorFlow[1]. During conversation the robot utilizes face recognition and
speech recognition to understand who says what. Face recognition has been
implemented using OpenFace[2] and speech recognition is powered by the
Google Speech API[9].
2. Conversation Flow In order to guide and respond during a one-to-one
conversation, the robot needs to reason over its knowledge (about itself, the
addressee, and the world) while taking into account its goals for the interac-
tion. To model this we follow a Belief, Desire, Intention (BDI)[5] approach.
Desires: The robot is designed to be hungry for social knowledge. This in-
cludes desires like asking for social personal information (name, profession,
interests, etc.), or asking for knowledge to resolve uncertainties and conflicts.
Beliefs: We consider the output of the other three layers to be part of the
core beliefs of the robot, thus including information about what is being
sensed, understood, and remembered during a conversation.
Intentions: The set of current beliefs combined with the overarching desires
then determine the next immediate action to be taken (aka. intention). The
robot is equipped with a plan library including all possible intentions such
as: a) Look for a person to talk to, b) Meet a new person, c) Greet a known
person, d) Detect objects, and e) Converse (including sub-intentions like
Ask a question, State a fact, Listen to talker, and Reply to a question). The
dialogues in the Appendix illustrate this behavior.
3. Natural Language During a conversation, information flows back and
forth. Thus, one of the goals of this layer is to transform natural language into
structured data as RDF triples. When the robot listens, the utterances are
stored along with the information about their speaker. After the perceived
speech is converted to text, it is tokenized. The NLP module first determines
if the utterance is a question or statement, because these are parsed differ-
ently. The parser consists of separate modules for different types of words,
which are called on-demand, thus not clogging the NLP pipeline unnecessar-
ily. This is important as Leolani needs to analyze an utterance and respond
fast in real-time. Currently, the classification of the roles of words, such as
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predicate, subject, object, is done by a rule-based system. Next, the subject,
object and predicate relations are mapped to triples for storage or querying
the brain. This module also performs a perspective analysis over the utter-
ance. Negation, certainty and sentiment or emotion are extracted separately
from the text and their values added to the triple representation. A second
goal of this layer is to produce natural language, based on output from either
layer I (e.g. standard greetings, farewells, and introductions) or IV (phrasing
answers given the knowledge in the brain and the goals defined in layer II).
The robot’s responses are produced using a set of rules to transform an RDF
triple into English language. For English, we created a grammar using the
concepts person (first, second, or third person pronouns or names), object,
location and lists of properties. With this basic grammar, the robot can al-
ready understand and generate a large portion of common language. In the
future, we will use WordNet to produce more varied responses and extend
the grammar to capture more varied input and roles.
4. Knowledge Representation The robot’s brain must store and represent
knowledge about the world, and the perspectives about it. For the latter
we use the GRaSP ontology, as mentioned in Section 3. For the former, we
created our own ontology “Nice to meet You”, which covers the basic con-
cepts and relations for human-robot social interaction (e.g. a person’s name,
place of origin, occupation, interests). Our ontology complies with 5 Star
Linked Open Data, and is linked to vocabularies like FOAF and schema.org.
Furthermore, the brain is able to query factual services like Wolfram Alpha,
and LOD resources like DBpedia and GeoNames. The robot’s brain is hosted
in a GraphDB triple store. Given the above, this layer allows for two main
interactions with the brain. The first is to process a statement, which im-
plies generating and uploading the corresponding triples to the brain with
source and perspective values. The second is to process a question, where a
SPARQL query is fired against the brain. The result, being an empty list or
a list with one or more results, is passed to layer III to generate a response.
A list of values may represent conflicting information (disjunctive values) or
multiple values (orthogonal values), each triggering different responses. In
the future, we will extend the capabilities by enabling the robot to reason
over its knowledge and generate new knowledge through inferencing.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We described a model for a robot’s world perception and communication, using
an RDF repository modeling a theory of mind. It allows us to deal with uncer-
tainties, conflicts, gaps, and different perspectives on this world. The state of in-
formation and knowledge the robot obtains can drive communication, e.g. the de-
sire to resolve conflicts or uncertainties. Currently, the scripts and knowledge are
limited. For the future, we plan to include different conversational models, NLP
modules and types of knowledge. Furthermore, we extend the platform to em-
pirically evaluate performance. Finally, we make the system functional through
task-based dialogues and the processing knowledge and situation-aware. Our im-
plementation is available as open source: https://github.com/cltl/pepper.
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Appendix: Dialogues
In the dialogues, L preceding an utterance stands
for Leolani, other letters preceding utterances stand
for various people. Perceptions of the robot of
people and objects are marked using square brack-
ets, e.g. [Sees a new face].
Meeting a new person
L: [Sees the face of an unknown woman]
L: Hi there, I would like to know you.
L: My name is Leolani, what is your name?
H: My name is Selene.
L:
[Stores the triples to represent Selene as
a new friend. If the confidence for the
name is too low, asks for confirmation]
L:
I hope I am correct and your name is:
Selene.
H: Yes that is my name.
L:
Nice to meet you Selene. Now I have a
new friend.
L:
[Queries the brain for information on
Selene to fill social gaps]
L: Where are you from?
H: I am from Mexico.
L:
[Stores the triples and queries the brain
for friends from Mexico. The query just
returns Selene.]
L: Now I know 1 person from Mexico.
Handling conflicting information
L:
[Sees a human face and recognizes
Lenka]
L: Hi Lenka, nice to see you.
L:
[Queries the brain and discovers she
does not know where Lenka is from]
L: Lenka, where are you from?
H: I am from Serbia.
L:
[Stores the triples and queries the brain
for friends from Serbia and finds only
Lenka.]
L:
Nice, I did not know anybody from
Serbia yet.
H: Where is Bram from?
L:
[Queries the brain for origin of Bram.
Finds Bram as a friend and information
where he is from.]
L: Bram is from the Netherlands.
H: Bram likes romantic movies.
L: [Stores the triples with Lenka as source.]
L:
You told me that Bram likes romantic
movies.
L: [Sees Lenka leave and sees Bram arrive.]
L: Hi Bram.
B: I like science fiction movies.
L:
[Stores the triples and queries what
Bram likes. Gets more than one value
while expecting one.]
L: I am surprised.
L: Bram likes romantic movies, says Lenka.
L:
Bram likes science fiction movies, says
Bram.
Checking information and trust
L: [Sees a human face and recognizes Bram]
L: Greetings Bram. Nice to see you again.
B: Do you know where I am from?
L: You are from the Netherlands, you said.
B: Do you also know Lenka?
L:
Yes I know her, she is a very good friend
of mine.
B: Where is she from?
L: Lenka is from Serbia, Lenka said
B: Do you believe Lenka?
L:
[Queries the brain for perspective
information on Lenka making this
statement. Finds no uncertainty or
denial.]
L: I believe her.
Observing the environment
L:
[Sees an object and detects it as a cat
with certain confidence]
L:
[Shortly after that she sees a human
face and recognizes Bram]
L: Greetings Bram. Nice to see you again.
L: Guess what? I just saw a cat!
B: That is not a cat but a rabbit.
L:
[Labels the image previously recognized
as a cat instead as a rabbit and stores it
in her brain]
B: I like this rabbit.
L: [Sees Bram leave and sees Selene arrive]
L: Hi Selene. Greetings.
L:
[The presence of the rabbit is prominent,
if the object is seen again recognition of
a rabbit overrides recognition of a cat
despite a higher score of the latter]
L: Guess what, I just met a rabbit.
S: A rabbit bites.
S: I like a cat more.
S: Have you ever seen a cat?
L:
[Queries the brain for objects labeled as
cat and perceived by the sensor]
L: No I have never seen a cat.
S: What animals did you see?
L:
[Queries the brain for objects labeled as
subtype of animal and perceived by the
sensor]
L: I saw a rabbit and a panda.
S: What does rabbit do?
L:
[Queries the brain for properties
assigned to the rabbit through
conversations]
L: Rabbits bite, Selene said.
L: Rabbits cuddle, Bram said.
S: Who likes rabbits?
L:
[Queries the brain for like perspective
on the rabbit through conversations]
L: Bram likes rabbits, Bram said.
